Sunday, April 23, 2006
Indo-US Nuclear Deal
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=89034
Indian Express
New Delhi
March 6, 2006
Next steps in the Indo-US deal
GURMEET KANWAL
Posted online: Monday, March 06, 2006 at 0000 hours IST
The Indo-US nuclear deal has been signed. The next step is to get it passed through the US Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This also entails amending the laws, so that India can receive the same benefits as those states that are a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, while the recent agreement is, in one sense, the culmination of a process that began in Washington on July 18, 2005, it will be a long hard grind before India can begin to reap the benefits of this historic deal and be recognised as a nuclear-armed world power.
No one should be under any illusion that the agreement will pass muster with the US Congress simply because the Republicans have the necessary numbers. There are still deeply entrenched mindsets within the US State Department and the non-proliferation ayatollahs are livid that the US has decided to make India an exception. They will lobby hard with senators, Congressmen and women to obstruct its smooth passage. Above all, it is an election year in the US, and members of the Congress will have their ears cocked for dissenting voices back in their constituencies. Politicians everywhere like the sound of their own voice and in the US, in particular, they love to fight phantoms on primetime TV. Hence, India should be prepared to see the US administration being closely questioned about the wisdom of the deal.
Members of Congress will query India's non-proliferation track record, especially the violation of the 'peaceful use' agreement regarding the Canadian-supplied Cirus reactor to produce plutonium for nuclear warheads. They will also demand to know the upper limit that India considers justified on the number of nuclear warheads that it wishes to stockpile for a credible minimum deterrence. They will ask why the US should help India increase its stockpile by providing uranium supplies that will allow India to divert its own uranium for nuclear warheads. Senator John Kerry has said in India this January that vertical proliferation will not be acceptable and that India cannot have an open-ended nuclear warhead programme. And, of course, members will question the wisdom of the administration in accepting India's fast-breeder reactors outside the civilian list.
Another issue that is likely to figure in the Congress is India's quest for nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) armed with SLBMs for survivable retaliatory strike capability. Several members of the US Congress have been paranoid about India acquiring such a capability, as they see it as a direct threat to US national security interests. Congressman Tom Lantos (Democrat, California) had called Natwar Singh, India's former minister for external affairs, 'dense' for failing to see the linkage between the nuclear deal and India's support for the US position in the IAEA on the Iranian nuclear crisis. While India has already voted twice with the US on this issue, the connection will undoubtedly come up again when the Congress debates the nuclear deal.
The US has for long hoped that India would support it directly in Iraq by providing an infantry division to take over a sector for counter-insurgency operations, as the Indian army has the capability and the experience to intervene effectively. The BJP-led NDA government had almost agreed to provide a division and then backed out as it had failed to create a national consensus on the issue. With daily casualties mounting, and Iraq on the brink of civil war, this demand will come up again in the Congress as a quid pro quo. Members of the Congress will also ask the Bush administration to explain how the deal with India will benefit American business interests, as General Electric and Westinghouse, the leading nuclear technology suppliers in the US, do not have state-of-the-art technology to meet India's huge demand. It is well known that India is likely to approach France and Russia for nuclear reactors in the short term. Hence the US Congress may look for a big-ticket purchase of weapons and equipment by India like F-16 or F-18 fighter-bombers and may link the passage of the deal to such a purchase. The game has only just begun.
Should India sit back and let the US administration bat on its behalf? That will be a mistake, as there will be many queries that only the Indians in Washington can answer. Well, the battle lines will soon be drawn for the big fight ahead and Ambassador Ronen Sen and his team will have their hands full. Luckily they will have President George W. Bush on their side.
(The writer is director, Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)
Indian Express
New Delhi
March 6, 2006
Next steps in the Indo-US deal
GURMEET KANWAL
Posted online: Monday, March 06, 2006 at 0000 hours IST
The Indo-US nuclear deal has been signed. The next step is to get it passed through the US Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This also entails amending the laws, so that India can receive the same benefits as those states that are a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, while the recent agreement is, in one sense, the culmination of a process that began in Washington on July 18, 2005, it will be a long hard grind before India can begin to reap the benefits of this historic deal and be recognised as a nuclear-armed world power.
No one should be under any illusion that the agreement will pass muster with the US Congress simply because the Republicans have the necessary numbers. There are still deeply entrenched mindsets within the US State Department and the non-proliferation ayatollahs are livid that the US has decided to make India an exception. They will lobby hard with senators, Congressmen and women to obstruct its smooth passage. Above all, it is an election year in the US, and members of the Congress will have their ears cocked for dissenting voices back in their constituencies. Politicians everywhere like the sound of their own voice and in the US, in particular, they love to fight phantoms on primetime TV. Hence, India should be prepared to see the US administration being closely questioned about the wisdom of the deal.
Members of Congress will query India's non-proliferation track record, especially the violation of the 'peaceful use' agreement regarding the Canadian-supplied Cirus reactor to produce plutonium for nuclear warheads. They will also demand to know the upper limit that India considers justified on the number of nuclear warheads that it wishes to stockpile for a credible minimum deterrence. They will ask why the US should help India increase its stockpile by providing uranium supplies that will allow India to divert its own uranium for nuclear warheads. Senator John Kerry has said in India this January that vertical proliferation will not be acceptable and that India cannot have an open-ended nuclear warhead programme. And, of course, members will question the wisdom of the administration in accepting India's fast-breeder reactors outside the civilian list.
Another issue that is likely to figure in the Congress is India's quest for nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) armed with SLBMs for survivable retaliatory strike capability. Several members of the US Congress have been paranoid about India acquiring such a capability, as they see it as a direct threat to US national security interests. Congressman Tom Lantos (Democrat, California) had called Natwar Singh, India's former minister for external affairs, 'dense' for failing to see the linkage between the nuclear deal and India's support for the US position in the IAEA on the Iranian nuclear crisis. While India has already voted twice with the US on this issue, the connection will undoubtedly come up again when the Congress debates the nuclear deal.
The US has for long hoped that India would support it directly in Iraq by providing an infantry division to take over a sector for counter-insurgency operations, as the Indian army has the capability and the experience to intervene effectively. The BJP-led NDA government had almost agreed to provide a division and then backed out as it had failed to create a national consensus on the issue. With daily casualties mounting, and Iraq on the brink of civil war, this demand will come up again in the Congress as a quid pro quo. Members of the Congress will also ask the Bush administration to explain how the deal with India will benefit American business interests, as General Electric and Westinghouse, the leading nuclear technology suppliers in the US, do not have state-of-the-art technology to meet India's huge demand. It is well known that India is likely to approach France and Russia for nuclear reactors in the short term. Hence the US Congress may look for a big-ticket purchase of weapons and equipment by India like F-16 or F-18 fighter-bombers and may link the passage of the deal to such a purchase. The game has only just begun.
Should India sit back and let the US administration bat on its behalf? That will be a mistake, as there will be many queries that only the Indians in Washington can answer. Well, the battle lines will soon be drawn for the big fight ahead and Ambassador Ronen Sen and his team will have their hands full. Luckily they will have President George W. Bush on their side.
(The writer is director, Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)
Nuclear Numbers
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1499221.cms
Nuclear Numbers
GURMEET KANWAL
The Times of India
April 22, 2006
One of the contentious issues that had threatened to derail the historic nuclear agreement signed by India and the US is the number of nuclear warheads that India needs for credible minimum deterrence.
While the estimates put forward by Indian analysts range from one to two dozen 'survivable' warheads at the lower end of the spectrum to over 400 warheads, these are mainly based on gut judgments and not on cold logic.
Nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of 'fighting'. Their sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. A nation's nuclear force structure depends on its nuclear doctrine and deterrence philosophy.
The number of nuclear warheads that a nation must stockpile depends on availability and quality of weapons-grade fissile material, its mastery of nuclear weapons design technology, the accuracy and reliability of its delivery systems, the fiscal constraints that govern its defence budget, the present and future air and missile defence capability of its adversaries, and their ability to absorb retaliatory nuclear strikes.
If deterrence fails, in keeping with its nuclear doctrine, India will have to absorb a nuclear strike before retaliating against the adversary's major cities and industrial centres.
India's targeting philosophy is based on a 'counter value' (as against 'counter force') strategy of massive punitive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage to the adversary's major population and industrial centres.
A retaliatory strike capability to destroy eight to 10 major population and industrial centres would be adequate to meet the requirements of deterrence.
For 10 counter value targets to be destroyed in the adversary country, a total of 40 nuclear warheads, at four warheads of 20 to 40 kiloton each per target, would be adequate to cause unacceptable damage in a retaliatory nuclear strike.
This is possible if the probable error of the Agni IRBM delivery systems is taken to be 1,000 metres and a destruction assurance level of 0.7 (about 70 per cent) is considered acceptable.
If the efficiency or overall reliability of India's nuclear delivery system is taken to be between 0.5 and 0.6 (50 to 60 per cent), a reasonable assumption for a modern nuclear force, then 75 warheads must actually be launched for about 40 to 45 warheads to explode successfully over their targets as some missiles may fail to take off, some may veer off course, some may be intercepted and some warheads may either fail to explode or may explode in a sub-optimal manner.
Hence, a minimum of 75 warheads and, of course, their delivery systems must survive the enemy's first strike on Indian targets and be available for retaliation.
Despite the best possible concealment and dispersion measures, approximately 50 per cent of the nuclear warheads and delivery systems may be destroyed in a first strike by the adversary.
It would, therefore, be reasonable to plan a warhead stocking level of at least twice the number of warheads that are actually required to be launched, that is, 150 warheads.
The last aspect to be catered for is a prudent level of reserves for larger than anticipated damage to own nuclear forces in a first strike and for unforeseen eventualities.
Escalation control and war termination strategies would also be dependent on the ability to launch counter-recovery strikes and some fresh strikes. One-third the required number of warheads should be adequate as reserves.
Hence, the total requirement works out to 200 nuclear warheads for a minimum deterrence doctrine with a no-first-use strategy if 10 major population and industrial centres are to be attacked in a retaliatory strike to achieve a 70 to 80 per cent assurance level of destruction.
The safeguard restrictions that India has voluntarily accepted under the agreement with the US and the number of nuclear reactors that it has decided to keep in the military list will ensure that India has adequate fissile material to manufacture 200 plus nuclear warheads.
Treaty obligations will not compromise India's sovereign right to take all steps necessary to assemble a larger number of warheads if needed in future. It is time to let this issue rest and move on.
The writer is with the Observer Research Foundation.
Nuclear Numbers
GURMEET KANWAL
The Times of India
April 22, 2006
One of the contentious issues that had threatened to derail the historic nuclear agreement signed by India and the US is the number of nuclear warheads that India needs for credible minimum deterrence.
While the estimates put forward by Indian analysts range from one to two dozen 'survivable' warheads at the lower end of the spectrum to over 400 warheads, these are mainly based on gut judgments and not on cold logic.
Nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of 'fighting'. Their sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. A nation's nuclear force structure depends on its nuclear doctrine and deterrence philosophy.
The number of nuclear warheads that a nation must stockpile depends on availability and quality of weapons-grade fissile material, its mastery of nuclear weapons design technology, the accuracy and reliability of its delivery systems, the fiscal constraints that govern its defence budget, the present and future air and missile defence capability of its adversaries, and their ability to absorb retaliatory nuclear strikes.
If deterrence fails, in keeping with its nuclear doctrine, India will have to absorb a nuclear strike before retaliating against the adversary's major cities and industrial centres.
India's targeting philosophy is based on a 'counter value' (as against 'counter force') strategy of massive punitive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage to the adversary's major population and industrial centres.
A retaliatory strike capability to destroy eight to 10 major population and industrial centres would be adequate to meet the requirements of deterrence.
For 10 counter value targets to be destroyed in the adversary country, a total of 40 nuclear warheads, at four warheads of 20 to 40 kiloton each per target, would be adequate to cause unacceptable damage in a retaliatory nuclear strike.
This is possible if the probable error of the Agni IRBM delivery systems is taken to be 1,000 metres and a destruction assurance level of 0.7 (about 70 per cent) is considered acceptable.
If the efficiency or overall reliability of India's nuclear delivery system is taken to be between 0.5 and 0.6 (50 to 60 per cent), a reasonable assumption for a modern nuclear force, then 75 warheads must actually be launched for about 40 to 45 warheads to explode successfully over their targets as some missiles may fail to take off, some may veer off course, some may be intercepted and some warheads may either fail to explode or may explode in a sub-optimal manner.
Hence, a minimum of 75 warheads and, of course, their delivery systems must survive the enemy's first strike on Indian targets and be available for retaliation.
Despite the best possible concealment and dispersion measures, approximately 50 per cent of the nuclear warheads and delivery systems may be destroyed in a first strike by the adversary.
It would, therefore, be reasonable to plan a warhead stocking level of at least twice the number of warheads that are actually required to be launched, that is, 150 warheads.
The last aspect to be catered for is a prudent level of reserves for larger than anticipated damage to own nuclear forces in a first strike and for unforeseen eventualities.
Escalation control and war termination strategies would also be dependent on the ability to launch counter-recovery strikes and some fresh strikes. One-third the required number of warheads should be adequate as reserves.
Hence, the total requirement works out to 200 nuclear warheads for a minimum deterrence doctrine with a no-first-use strategy if 10 major population and industrial centres are to be attacked in a retaliatory strike to achieve a 70 to 80 per cent assurance level of destruction.
The safeguard restrictions that India has voluntarily accepted under the agreement with the US and the number of nuclear reactors that it has decided to keep in the military list will ensure that India has adequate fissile material to manufacture 200 plus nuclear warheads.
Treaty obligations will not compromise India's sovereign right to take all steps necessary to assemble a larger number of warheads if needed in future. It is time to let this issue rest and move on.
The writer is with the Observer Research Foundation.
